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Article 8

BACK TO THE FUTURE? THE PROSPECTS FOR STATE
MONOPOLY IN HYDROCARBONS AND ELECTRIC
POWER UNDER ARTICLE 27 OF
THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION
EWELL E. MURPHY, JR.*

I.

SEIZING THE INITIATIVE

When Venustiano Carranza summoned municipal council delegates of
war-torn Mexico to a constitutional convention in Quer~taro, he did not
encourage them to innovate. Instead he presented his own modest revision
of the 1857 Constitution and allowed the delegates a scant two months
to review and improve it.'
The delegates seized the initiative, however, and transformed Carranza's
modest revision into a radical new document, "the first revolutionary
state charter of modern times," ' 2 "one of the most significant constitutional documents of the present century," ' 3 the Mexican Constitution
of 1917.
"In a real sense this document legalized the Mexican Revolu4
tion."

Of all provisions of the 1917 Constitution, Article 27 is its "most
distinctive feature . . ., the one that has given form and meaning to the

Mexican Revolution." ' 5 "More than any other article of the new constitution," one historian concluded, "[Article 27] represented the break
with the Porfirian past, embodied the cry for economic independence,
proclaimed the destruction of vested interests, and gave hope of a better
future to the rural masses. In short, it was the convention's most singular
achievement.' '6 Another historian called Article
27 "the most significant
'7
legal outcome of the Mexican Revolution."
Article 27 addressed la propiedad ratz: the land, waters and subsoil
minerals that the Mexican revolutionaries of 1910 believed to be their
nation's most precious wealth and the domination of which by foreigners,
large real estate holders (los latifundistas)and the Church epitomized the
social evil they fought to overcome. Article 27 of the 1857 Constitution,
on which Carranza based his draft, guaranteed that no private property

AT

* Retired partner of the Houston law firm of Baker & Botts.
1. The historical context of the convention is described in E.V. NIEMEYER, JR., REVOLUTION
QUER]TARO chs. 1, 2 (1974).
2. ANITA BRENNER, THE WIND THAT SWEPT MExico 55 (1984).
3. FRANK TANNENBAUM, PEACE BY REVOLUTION: MEXICO AFTER 1910, at 169 (1966).
4. NIEMEYER, supra note 1, at 30.
5. Id. at 134.
6. Id. at 165.
7. TANNENBAUM, supra note 3, at 169.
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could be "occupied" (ocupada) without prior compensation, due process
and the owner's consent; its only land restriction applied to civil and
religious corporations, which were forbidden to own real estate except
the buildings their purposes "immediately and directly" (inmediata y
directamente) required.8 Carranza's draft embellished those provisions by
eliminating owner's consent as a condition to eminent domain, guaranteeing that communal lands (los ejidos) would be respected until divided,
and adding specifics of the rule that religious, charitable and business
entities could own only such land as their activities required. 9 The delegates
replaced that embellishment with an elaborate new Article 27 embodying
a stark "new theory of property" 10 that attempted "to reduce all property
in Mexico to 'conditional ownership.""' By that theory "[p]roperty ' in
12
fee simple ... ceased to exist in law, so far as Mexico is concerned
and "[p]rivate property cease[d] to be an absolute right, in order to be
converted to a right limited by the public interest."' 3
The new Article 27 made three fundamental assertions:
First, the Nation has "original title" (la propiedad ... corresponde
originalmente) to all land and water in Mexico. Thus, because "at independence the rights to all private real property reverted to the nation
as the successor of the Spanish crown,' ' 4 the Nation could create "private
title" (la propiedadprivada) by conveyance to private persons, but having
done so the Nation nevertheless retained the right to impose on that
private title such conditions as the public interest requires. "Large properties" (los latifundios) would be divested down to small landholdings.
For example, communal lands would be restored, respected and eventually
divided, and needful communities would be given adjoining land and
water, but all expropriations would be conditioned on compensation and
public need.' 5
Second, the Nation has "direct ownership" (dominio directo) of subsoil
minerals and territorial waters. Because that ownership is "inalienable
and imprescriptible" (inalienabley imprescriptible),the federal government
could not convey mineral title, but could grant "concessions" (conce-

8. References in this article to the 1857 Constitution are based on the copy in Spanish reproduced

in LEYEs

FUNDAMENTALES DE MIXICO

1808-1975, at 607 (6th ed. 1975).

9. References in this article to Carranza's draft are based on Neimeyer's description and the
English translation coitained in NEImEYER, supra note 1, and Appendix D of the version elaborated
by Pastor Rouaix and other delegates. References to Section 27 of the 1917 Constitution and its
amendments are based on copies in Spanish reproduced in CONSrrrCI6N POLiTICA MEXICANA CON
REFORMAS Y ADiCIONES AL DiA (15th ed. Andrade Edition 1986 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter ANDRADE].
10. FRANK TANNENBA.UM, MExico: TtE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND BREAD 112 (1950), quoted in
NIEMEYER, supra note 1, at
11. TANNENBAUM, supra

232.
note 3, at 168.

12. Id. at 169.
13. "La propiedad privada deja de ser un derecho absoluto para convertirse en un derecho
limitado por el interds ptiblico." DIEGO VALADS, CONSTITUcI6N POLiTICA DE Los EsTADOS UNIDOS
MEXICANOS COMENTADA 125 (4th ed. 1993). The delegates' deliberations on Article 27 are described
in JORGE CARPizo, L.i CONSTiTUCI6N MEXICANA DE 1917, at 110-21 (8th ed. 1990).

14.

NEEMEYER,

supra note 1, at 141.

15.

ANDRADE,

supra note 9,

1-3, 8, 7(VI), at 9-12.
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siones) to private persons and Mexican companies on16 condition that they
perform exploitation operations required by statute.
Third, the ownership rights of some persons are expressly restricted.
Foreigners could not acquire "direct ownership" (dominio directo) of
land or waters within 100 kilometers of the border or 50 kilometers of
the sea, and unless they signed a Calvo Clause 17 could not have "ownership" (dominio) of land, water or mineral concessions anywhere in the
Republic.' Religious associations could not acquire any realty improvement or land; those they held reverted to the Nation, which automatically
owned all places of worship. 19 Charitable organizations could own only
such land as their operations required; 20 the same for private corporations,
which could not own agricultural land 22at all. 21 Banks were similarly
limited, but could make mortgage loans.
The delegates believed that those assertions "laid the constitutional
'23
basis for the solution of the underlying problem of the revolution.
By their new theory of property, "[t]he rights of society were made to
prevail over the rights of the individual" and "the State was endowed
with special powers to ensure more equitable distribution of the national
wealth.' 4 That was "what they had come to Quer~taro to write." ' 25
History, nevertheless, moved on and Article 27 moved with it. Since
its promulgation in the 1917 Constitution, Article 27 has been amended
fifteen times, almost twice the number of all amendments of the United
States Constitution during the same period. Some of those Article 27
amendments were as revolutionary as the original text itself: effectuating
the right of needful communities to have land expropriated for their use
as communal lands (ejidos),26 creating state monopolies in hydrocarbons
and electric power; 27 and, in the iconoclastic amendments of President
Carlos Salinas de Gortari's Administration, allowing religious organiza-

16. Id.
4-6.
17- Named for the Argentine diplomat and jurist, Carlos Calvo (1824-1906), this term refers
generally to the waivers he advocated of a foreigner's access to foreign tribunals and diplomatic

espousal of the foreigner's claim against the local sovereign. Article 27 requires, as a condition to
ownership by foreigners of referenced interests, "that they agree before the Ministry of Foreign
Relations to consider themselves as nationals with respect to said properties and therefore not to
invoke the protection of their governments with respect to them" (que convengan ante la Secretarla
de Relaciones en considerarse como nacionales respecto de dichos bienes y en no invocar por lo
mismo la proteccidn de sus gobiernos por lo que se refiere a aquellos). See ANDRADE, supra note

9.
18. Id.

7(I).

19. Id. 7(11).
20. Id. 1 7(111).
21. Id. 99 7(IV), 7(VII).
22. Id. I 7(V).

23. NEEMEYER, supra note 1, at 233.
24. Id. at 232.
25. Id. at 233.
26. Amendments of Feb. 12, 1947 and Feb. 6, 1976. In this article amendments to the Mexican
Constitution are identified by reference to their dates of publication in the DIuAIo OFIcAL DE LA
FEDERACI6N [OpFICIAL GAZEttE OF THE FEDERaaoN-hereinafter D.O.] (as reported by Andrade
Edition).
27. Amendments of Nov. 9, 1940, Jan. 20, 1960 and Dec. 29, 1960.
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tions to own land, 28 permitting the ejidos to privatize themselves, 29 and
abolishing the30 right of needful communities to acquire new ejidos by
expropriation.
II.

EXCEPTIONAL EPISODES

From the perspective of Mexico's economic future, no provision of
Article 27 is more significant than the amendments that declared hydrocarbons and electric power to be state monopolies. Like the original text
of Article 27 itself, those amendments are the product of exceptional
episodes of Medcan history. To appreciate the amendments' power and
persistence, it is necessary to review those episodes.
Hydrocarbons
Foreign enterprise began to develop Mexican oil during the administration of President Porfirio Diaz, when the legal basis for private
investment seemed secure. In 1884 Mexico's first Federal Mining Code
gave surface owners the right to subsurface oil, 3 ' in 1901 the first Petroleum Law authorized the Mexican government to grant oil concessions
in public lands 3 2 and the Mining Law of 1909 reaffirmed the subsoil
rights of surface owners.3 3 Thus encouraged, private companies (chiefly
British and U.S.) increased Mexico's daily oil production prodigiously,
from 10 thousand barrels in 1901 to 3.9 million in 1908, 55 million in
1917 and 193.4 million in 1921, 4 when Mexico ranked second among
35
oil-producing nations, providing one-fourth of the world's production.
Nevertheless, one of the objectives of the Mexican Revolution was to
reduce the power of foreign investors. In hydrocarbons the delegates at
Quer~taro threw down the gauntlet with Article 27's assertion that the
36
Nation has "inalienable and imprescriptible" ownership of the subsoil.
President Plutarco Calles implemented that assertion with the 1925 Petroleum Law, which commanded prior grantees of subsoil titles to apply
for "confirmatory concessions" of limited duration. 37 Led by Jersey
Standard the U.S. companies, in particular, clamored for the U.S. government to intervene against that ex post facto diminution of their subsoil
rights, but by a vote of seventy-nine to zero the U.S. Senate responded
with a conciliatory resolution recommending that the dispute be settled

A.

28. Amendment of Jan. 28, 1992.
29. Amendment of Jan. 6, 1992.
30. Id.
31. GEORGE W. GRAYSON, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN OIL 4 (1980); HARRY K. WRIGHT, FOREIGN
ENTERPRISE IN MEaxico 56 (1971).

32. GRAYSON, supra note 31, at 9; WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 56.
33. Id.
34. GRAYSON, supra note 31, at 10.
35. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 62.

36. ANDRADE, supra note 9, art. 27.
37. GEORGE PHmIP, OIL AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 37 (1982); WRIGHT, supra note 31, at
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by international arbitration,38 and in 1928 Mexico compromised by amendin perpetuity all concessions that
ing the 1925 Petroleum Law to confirm
39
antedated the 1917 Constitution.
During the next ten years the position of foreign oil companies in
Mexico was progressively undermined by labor troubles, tax disputes,
resistance to retail price increases, and the assertion that faced with
deteriorating political prospects the companies were damaging their reservoirs with wasteful drilling and production practices. Those combustible
elements of confrontation were ignited by a general strike of oil unions,
which the Mexican government referred to a commission of economic
nationalists. That commission awarded wage increases which the major
companies refused to pay. On March 18, 1938 President Ldzaro Cdrdenas
retaliated by expropriating the strike-bound major companies. 4°
Petrdleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), a state enterprise, was formed in 1938
to operate the expropriated properties and, in 1940, Article 27 was
amended to prohibit the granting of hydrocarbon "concessions" (concesiones).41 For a time, the smaller unexpropriated companies were allowed
to function and the Petroleum Law permitted PEMEX to contract out
exploitation operations, but in 1960 a further amendment of Article 2742
terminated all existing concessions, declaring that "the Nation will carry
out the exploitation" of hydrocarbon "products," and added the rather
hyperbolic declaration that neither "concessions
nor contracts" (conce43
siones ni contratos) would be granted.
B.

Electric power
In electric power, Mexico's transition to state monopoly was much less
acrimonious. The earliest producers were private, but their expansion was
impeded in 1933 by the beginning of rate regulation and challenged in
1937 by President Cdrdenas' creation of a competing state enterprise, la
Comisidn Federal de Electricidad (C.F.E.). After World War II C.F.E.'s44
national market share rose rapidly, from 5% in 1945 to 49% in 1960.
Discouraged by their regulated rate returns, the private companies sold
their assets to Mexico in 1960, during the administration of President
Adolfo L6pez Mateos, and Article 27 was accordingly amended 45 to declare
that "[g]enerating, transmitting, transforming, distributing and supplying

38. PmI, supra note 37, at 38.
39. WRIcHT, supra note 31, at 64.
40. Id. at 68-70. See also JOHN MASON HART, REVOLUTIONARY MEaxico, at 141-46, 330-31, 342-

43 (1987). The effect of the Mexican expropriation on Latin American hydrocarbon history generally
is described in Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., State Entities and Private Oil Companies: The Contest for
Leadership in the Development of Latin American Oil and Gas, INTL ENERGY L. 79 (1984).
41. Amendment of Nov. 9, 1940. See WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 126-28.
42. Amendment of Jan. 20, 1960.
43. "Tratdndose del petrdleo y de los carburos de hidrdgeno s6lidos, l[quidos o gaseosos, no
se otorgaran concesiones ni contratos, ni subsistiran los que se hayan otorgado y la Nacidn llevard
a cabo la explotacidn de esos productos, en los tdrminos que seflale la ley reglamentariarespectiva."
Id.
44. WIoT, supra note 31, at 66, 80-83.
45. Amendment of Jan. 20, 1960.
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electric power for the purpose of providing public service corresponds
exclusively to the Nation" and that related "concessions will not be
granted to private parties.'' 46
III.

PERIMETERS AND PENUMBRAS

Mexico has articulated the scope of its state monopolies in hydrocarbons
and electric power by four means: first, reglamentary laws and other
legislation empowering PEMEX and C.F.E.; second, prohibitions in foreign investment laws against competition by foreign enterprise; third,

similar prohibitions in regulations issued under the foreign investment
laws; and fourth, Mexican reservations in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). 47 In the case of PEMEX, of those three means
the first, second and third have established perimeters of monopolistic
exclusivity broader than necessitated by the literal mandate of the corresponding Article 27 amendment. For both PEMEX and C.F.E., the
second, third and fourth means have added ancillary penumbras of
protection against foreign investors, contractors and suppliers. The result
is two autonomous leviathans of very considerable economic clout.
A.

Hydrocarbons
The reglamentary law that implements the hydrocarbons monopoly4
defines the "petroleum industry" as covering everything from exploration
through refining, manufacture, transportation, storage, distribution and
initial sale of oil, gas, and all petroleum derivatives "that may be used
as basic industrial raw materials;" and provides that only the Nation,
acting through PEMEX, may conduct it. 4 9 Although that statute allows
PEMEX to employ private service contractors, it requires them to be

46. "Corresponde exclusivamente a Ia Nacidn generar, conducir, transformar,distribuiry abastecer
energla eloctrica que tenga por objeto la prestacidn de servicio pdblico. En esta materia no se
otorgaran concesiones a los particulares y la Nacidn aprovechard los bienes y recursos naturales
que se requieran para dichos fines." Id.
47. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R. Doc. No.
103-159 (effective Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The significance of the Mexican hydrocarbons
monopoly to the NAFTA negotiations is discussed in Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., The Dilemma of
Hydrocarbon Investment in Mexico's Accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement, 9
J. ENERGY NAT. REsouRcas & ENvTL. L. 261 (1991).
The results of the NAFTA negotiations in the hydrocarbons and electric power sectors are
summarized in GARY C. HUFaAUER & JEFFREY J. ScHorr, NAFTA: AN AssESSMENT, at 33-36, 12021 (1993) [hereinafter HUFBAUER & SCHOTT]. See also Gary C. Hufbauer et al., What the North
American Free Trade Agreement Means to Business: An Industry-by-Industry Analysis of Effects
and Opportunities, 9 CoP. CouNs. Q. 52, 53-56 (1993). Hufbauer & Schott conclude: "By our
standards, the NAFTA thus receives a low score for its failure to liberalize investment in the
petroleum sector," "UFBAUER & SCHOTT at 32. They also rank NAFTA results in the energy sector
at a C+ on a scale of A to C. Id. at 10.
48. Ley Reglamentariadel Artculo 27 Constitucional en el Ramo del Petr6leo [Regulatory Law
of Constitutional Article 27 in the Field of Petroleum], D.O. (Nov. 29, 1958, as amended, D.O.
Dec. 30, 1977) (Mex.).
Editor's Note: Citations to the D.O. relating to the 1989 Regulations do not cite to specific
articles because the 1989 Regulations are not arranged as "articles," but, instead, are included in
one Schedule at the end [hereinafter Schedule].
49. Id. arts. 3-4.
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paid in cash and prohibits compensating them by means of a percentage

of production or participation in exploitation results. PEMEX's domination of the Mexican hydrocarbons industry is further assured by legislation that details the exclusive position of state enterprise in oilo and

basic petrochemicals. 51

As against foreign investors the PEMEX monopoly is succinctly shielded
by the foreign investment law, which lists "Petroleum and other hydro-

carbons" (Petrdleoy demds hidrocarburos)and "Basic petrochemicals"
(Petroqumica bdsica) as "strategic areas" in which functions may be
reserved exclusively to the state, and limits "Retail sale of gasoline and

distribution of liquid petroleum gas" (Comercio al por menor de gasolina
y distribuci6n de gas licuado de petr6leo) to Mexicans. 52 The current
foreign investment regulations detail those exclusivities and add exclusions
53
of foreigners from other services outside the PEMEX monopoly.
In the NAFTA negotiations, the hydrocarbons monopoly presented two
obstacles to the general objective of allowing nationals of Canada and
the United States to perform services, or to sell and invest in Mexico.
The first obstacle was the monopoly itself: if the exploitation of hydrocarbons, or any included activity, falls within the monopoly granted to
PEMEX, PEMEX has the exclusive right to perform it. The second

obstacle resulted from Article 27's directive that neither concessions nor
contracts regarding oil exploitation may be granted. That directive suggests

50. Reglamento de la Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucionalen el Ramo del Petrdleo
[Regulation of Regulatory Law of Constitutional Article 27 in the Field of Petroleum], D.O. (Aug.
25, 1959, as amended, D.O. Feb. 9, 1971 and D.O. Jan. 8, 1990) (Mex.). The functions of PEMEX
are also listed in Article 3 of its Organic Law, Ley Orgdnica de Petr6leos Mexicanos y Organismos
Subsidiarios [OrganicLaw of Petrdleos Mexicanos and Subsidiary Organisms], D.O. (July 16, 1992,
as amended, D.O. Dec. 22, 1993) (Mex.).
51. Reglamento de la Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucionalen el ramo del petrdleo,
en materia de petroquimica [Regulation of Regulatory Law of ConstitutionalArticle 27 in the field
of petroleum, in the matter of petrochemicals], D.O. (Feb. 9, 1971, as amended, D.O. Nov. 25,
1993.) (Mex.). The current classification by the Secretario de Energia, Minas y Industria Paraestatal
[Secretary of Energy, Mines, and State Industry] of petrochemicals as "basic" or "secondary"
appears in D.O. (Aug. 17, 1992) (Mex.). The legislative basis for PEMEX is discussed in Rogelio
L6pez-Velarde, Mexico's New Petroleum Law: The Internal Reforms at PEMEX and the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 28 INT'L LAW. 1 (1994) [hereinafter L6pez-Velarde].
52. Ley de Inversidn Extranjera [Law of Foreign Investment], arts. 5-6, D.O. (Dec. 27, 1993)
(Mex.).
53. Reglamento de la Ley paraPromover la Inversidn Mexicana y Regular la Inversidn Extranjera
[Regulation of the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment], D.O.
(May 19, 1989) (Mex.), was issued under the previous foreign investment statute but by Transitory
Article 4 of the present Foreign Investment Law remains effective until amended. The Schedule
lists the extraction of petroleum and natural gas (extraccidn depetrdleo y gas natural), the manufacture
of basic petrochemical products (fabricacidn de productos petroqu(micos bdsicos) and petroleum
refining (refinacidn de petrdleo) as activities reserved exclusively to the state; the retail sale of
combustible liquid natural gas (comercio al pormenor de gas licuado combustible) as an activity
reserved to Mexicans; the manufacture of secondary petrochemical products (fabricacidnde productos
petroqutmicos secundarios) as an activity in which foreign investors can have up to 40% share
ownership; and the drilling of oil and gas wells (perforacidn de pozos petroleros y de gas) and
construction for the transmission of petroleum and derivates (construccidn para la conduccidn de
petrdleo y derivados) as activities in which foreigners may not have majority share ownership without
authorization by the Foreign Investment Commission. See Schedule, supra note 48.

U.S. -MEXICO

LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

that, even if PEMEX prefers to discharge its monopoly by hiring out

a hydrocarbon exploitation activity rather than performing the activity
itself, PEMEX may not do so by means of what Article 27 calls "concessions" or "contracts."
In its express reservations to NAFTA, Mexico dealt with the first
obstacle by exempting a broad range of "strategic activities" in hydrocarbons, from exploration through "first hand sales" of basic petrochemicals;5 4 reserving to the Mexican State "investment and ... the
provision of services in such activities;" ' 55 and declaring that the crossborder access of Canadian and U.S. enterprise will apply to such activities
only "when Mexico permits a contract to be granted in respect of such
activities and only to the extent of that contract.' '56 Dealing with the
second obstacle was more difficult because it required an oracular explanation of Article 27's hyperbolic prohibition of exploitation "contracts." Mexico bit that bullet by agreeing that, although "[r]isk-sharing
contracts are prohibited," 57 "[e]ach Party shall allow its state enterprises
to negotiate performance clauses in their service contracts."5' 8 The morning
after that opaque distinction was announced, the in-box of PEMEX's
procurement office was brimming, no doubt, with ingenious exploitation
proposals, each self-guaranteed to' 59involve merely "performance clauses"
and not "risk-sharing contracts.
Those reservations are augmented by Mexican exceptions to NAFTA
which incorporate various legislative restrictions on hydrocarbon operations by foreigners. Those exceptions declare that foreigners may have
no interest in a Mexican enterprise that stores, transports or sells liquefied
petroleum gas or installs "fixed deposits,''60 or sells at retail gasoline,
diesel, lubricants, oils or additives; 61 and that authorization by the Foreign.
Investment Commission is required for foreign ownership of more than
49% of a Mexican enterprise "involved in 'non-risk sharing' contracts
for the exploration and drilling works of petroleum and gas wells" or
in "construction of means for the transportation of petroleum and its
derivatives." 62

54. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 602(3) (incorporating annex 602.3,
1(a), 1(b)); Id. annex III
- Mexico, Section A (1). See also id. art. 601 (Principles).
55. Id. annex 602.3, 1.
56. Id. 2.
57. Id. annex I - Mexico, at I-M-23.
58. Id. annex 602.3, 4.
59. Hufbauer and Schott conclude that contractors under "performance" contracts "can be paid
a bonus for exceeding contract targets." HuFBAUER & ScHorr, supra note 47, at 34. This suggests
that the intended distinction is between a permitted cash bonus (performance clause) and a forbidden
assignment of an interest in production (risk-sharing contract). L6pez-Velarde draws a finer line:
"The only thing clearly forbidden is that PEMEX and its subsidiaries make a payment in kind by
taking a percentage of the hydrocarbon production, or by granting as an incentive for the work
performed a participation in drilling even if the end payment is made in cash." L6pez-Velarde,
supra note 51, at 11.
60. NAFTA, supra note 47, annex I - Mexico, at I-M-27.
61. Id. at I-M-28.
62. Id. at I-M-23.
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NAFTA's broader penumbra of protection for PEMEX also extends
to government procurement. Under NAFTA generally, Canadian and
U.S. enterprises are granted the same access as Mexicans to every award
by an "entity" of the Mexican federal government of a construction
contract of U.S. $6.5 million or more and every other goods or services
award of U.S. $50,000 or more.63 For PEMEX that burden was eased
by (1) raising those levels to U.S. $8.0 million and U.S. $250,000,
respectively, for awards by a Mexican government "enterprise;' '64 (2)
granting "threshold" exemptions to PEMEX awards in aggregate percentages that decline annually from 50% in 1994 to zero in 2003;65 and
(3) allowing, in each subsequent year, a permanent exemption
for U.S.
66
$300 million in PEMEX and C.F.E. awards combined.
The aggregate result of those perimeters and penumbras is to expand,
by definition, the Mexican state monopoly from the bare "exploitation"
of hydrocarbons products mentioned in its Article 27 amendment to a
grander "petroleum industry" and "strategic area" with exclusive authority over refining and basic petrochemicals and complete or partial
insulation from foreign contractors and suppliers in a broad zone of
related transportation, services and retail sales.
B.

Electric power
Mexico's constitutional monopoly in electric power is implemented by
legislation that defines C.F.E.'s functions and insulates them from foreign
investment. Considerably less effusive than its hydrocarbons counterpart,
the C.F.E. empowering statute 67 reiterates the exclusivity language of
Article 2768 and honors the "public service" qualification of that language
by specifying significant industrial sectors to which the state monopoly
does not extend.6 9 The foreign investment law speaks more broadly of
"electricity" as a "strategic area" in which functions may be reserved
exclusively to the state. 0 Similarly, the foreign investment regulations
reserve extensive functions of generation and supply exclusively to the
state, without limitation as to "public service," and make foreign control
of several ancillary construction 71
services subject to authorization by the
Foreign Investment Commission.

63. Id. art. 1001.1(c)(i). As between Canada and the United States, NAFTA annex 1001.2c (the
more generous Article 1304 of their bilateral Free Trade Agreement, providing access for most
federal procurements above U.S. $25,000) remains effective.
64. Id. art. 1001.1(c)(ii).
65. Id. art. 1001.2(a); id. annex 1001.2a, 1 1-5.
66. Id. art. 1001.2(b); id. annex 1001.2b, Schedule of Mexico,
3(c).
67. Ley del Servicio Pdblico de Energfa Eldctrica [Law of Electrical Energy Public Service],
D.O. (Dec. 22, 1975, as amended, D.O. Dec. 27, 1983, D.O. Dec. 31, 1986, D.O. Dec. 27, 1989,
D.O. Dec. 23, 1992, and D.O. Dec. 22, 1993) (Mex.).
68. Id. art. 1.
69. Id. art 3, which describes generation for self-supply, co-generation and small production;
generation for sale to C.F.E.; generation for export; importation for self-supply; and generation
for emergency public use.
70. Id. art. 5.
71. The Schedule to the Foreign Investment Regulations lists the generation and transmission
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In the access they grant to Canadian and U.S. investors, Mexico's
NAFTA reservations track the Electric Service Law. Essentially, they
reiterate the corresponding Article 27 amendment 72 and, to elucidate its
qualification that the monopoly covers electric power used "for the
purpose of providing public service," carve out three electric power
operations-"Production for Own Use," "Co-generation" and "Independent Power Production' ' 73-that a private enterprise of Canada or
the United States will be allowed to conduct in Mexico. In related
construction operations the reservations for electric power are less stringent
than those for hydrocarbons. As noted above, NAFTA nationals are
prohibited from owning any interest in a Mexican company that installs
"fixed deposits" of hydrocarbons 74 and (absent Foreign Investment Commission authorization) from owning more than 49% of a Mexican contract
drilling company, 75 but in the case of Mexican companies that construct
electric installations there is only the latter authorization requirement,
and it will expire in 1999.76 Nevertheless, NAFTA allows C.F.E. procurement exemptions, both transitional and permanent, identical to those
77
it grants to PEMEX.
The result, particularly for Canadian and U.S. enterprise, is greater
foreign access to the Mexican electric power industry than to the Mexican
hydrocarbon industry.
IV.

AN IMPRESSIONISTIC IMAGE

A giant among the historians of Mexico, Frank Tannenbaum, expressed
a profound wisdom concerning the futility of reducing the intricacies of
human experience to simple rules. "No history has a unitary principle,"
he wrote. "The influences that shape human destiny are too subtle, and
the threads out of which history is woven are too numerous to be expressed
'7
by a formula.
Nothing proves Professor Tannenbaum's wisdom more dramatically
than the complexities of Mexican history, which, as he knew, cannot be

of electric energy (generaci6n y transmisidn de energla edctrica) and the supply of electric energy
(suministrode energlaelictrica) as activities reserved exclusively to the State; and electrical installations
in buildings (instalacioneseldctricas en edificios) and the construction of electricity generation plants
(construcci6n de plantas de generacin de electricidad)and construction and maintenance of electricity
lines and networks (construcci6n y tendido de lhneas y redes de conducci6n eljctrica) as activities
in which foreign investors may not have majority ownership without authorization by the Foreign
Investment Commission. Schedule, supra note 48.
72. NAFTA, supra note 47, art. 602(3) (incorporating annex 602.3,
1(c)); id. annex IIIMexico, Section A(2). See also id. art. 601 (Principles).
73. Id. annex 602.3,
5.
74. Id. annex I - Mexico, at I-M-27.
75. Id. at I-M-23.
76. Id. at I-M-21, concerning Construction of Industrial Plants, Construction of Electricity
Generation Plants, Construction and Maintenance of Electricity Conduction Lines and Networks
and Electrical Installations in Buildings.
77. NAFTA, supra note 47, arts. 1001.1(c)(ii), 1001.2(a) and (b); id. annex 1001.2a,
1-5; id.
annex 1001.2b, 3(c).

78.

TANNENBAUM,

supra note 3, at 3.
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reduced to formula. There is value, nonetheless, in addressing those
complexities with quick sketches of impression, not to subsume their
intricacies but to draw the perceiver closer to their essential force. Jos6
Clemente Orozco's canvases and Diego Rivera's murals do not exhaustively
recapitulate the Mexican Revolution, but they immerse us in it more
effectively than a hundred history books. I offer such an impressionistic
image of Article 27 and its amendments. It is an oversimplification, of
course, but it may bring us nearer to that famous edict's dynamic core.
That image is the challenged time-warp of Article 27's two attempts
to withdraw Mexico from the Modern Age.
For three long Spanish centuries Mexico was secluded from the Modern
Age. She spent her protracted colonial childhood in pre-Modern isolation,
moated from the Renaissance, interdicted from the Reformation, shielded
from the Industrial Revolution in cloisters fashioned by Castilian hidalgos,
guarded by Hapsburg and Bourbon kings. When Independence burst open
the cloister doors Mexico was unprepared to depart her pre-Modern
sanctuary and brave the capitalistic, middle-class, Modern world outside.
She had no capital, because she had no capitalism. She had no middleclass institutions, because she had no middle class. The North American
Wars, the French Intervention, the Porfiriate and the Mexican Revolution
were measures of her unpreparedness. The original Article 27 and its
state monopoly amendments are calibrations of Mexico's fearful recourse
of seeking refuge in imaginary time-worlds less demanding than the
Modern
Age.
"Realizing
that foreigners, latifundistas and the Church had come
to
dominate Mexican land because Mexicans failed to develop a competitive
capitalism of their own, the delegates at Quer~taro abjured the fee simple
title of the Modern Age and relegated that land to a time-world of preModern feudalism in which a sovereign could condition or rescind, at
any time, its prior grants. Later, when Mexican Presidents realized that
foreigners had come to dominate Mexico's hydrocarbon and electric power
industries because Mexicans, again, had failed to develop a competitive
capitalism of their own, the Presidents nationalized those industries and,
to protect them from the foreign capitalism of the Modern Age, encased
them in a time-world of post-Modern socialism in which the principal
means of production were monopolies of the state.
But now the Berlin Wall has fallen. Free enterprise is the economic
icon of industrial mankind; the world sees earlier auguries of Marxist
productivity as a discredited Potemkin village. Formerly socialist nations
scurry to privatize their inefficient, money-gorging state monopolies, hydrocarbons and electric power included. The post-Modern time-world in
which Mexican Presidents insulated PEMEX and C.F.E. has proved to
be as illusory as the pre-Modern time-world to which the delegates at
Quer~taro relegated Mexican land. Today, Mexicans realize that the authentic future is not post-Modern socialism, but Modern capitalism ddji
Vu.
The question, therefore, is whether Mexicans now have sufficient confidence in the competitiveness of their capitalism to reject both of their
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illusory time-worlds and enter, at last, the Modern Age of free enterprise.
In most business sectors, the legislative reforms of the Salinas Administration and the investment assurances of NAFTA have placed Mexico
firmly on that path,7 9 but what of hydrocarbons and electric power?
Anointed by the amendments of Article 27 and shielded by the protective
penumbras of foreign investment legislation and Mexico's reservations to
NAFTA, those state monopolies seemingly still stand secure. The world
wonders whether Mexico's newly elected President, Ernesto Zedillo, will
dare propose, and his newly independent Congress will dare approve, a
sixteenth amendment of Article 27 to lead Mexico, in those industries
as well, back to the future.

79. The sectors are described in Ewell E. Murphy, Jr., Opportunitiesfor U.S. Business in Mexico
under NAFTA, 10 CoRP. CoNs. Q. 55 (1994). Privatizations effected from 1989 to 1992 are analyzed
in Carlos Bazdresch and Carlos Elizondo, Privatization: The Mexican Case (1992) (Unpublished
Paper No. 93-05, on file with the Texas Papers on Mexico, Institute of Latin American Studies,
University of Texas (Austin)).

